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In Congress, committees are still at the center of pork barrel
politics
Is pork barrel spending still an important force for parties trying to shore up support for their
vulnerable members? In new research which tracks earmarks across the twelve House
Appropriations subcommittees in the 110th Congress, Austin Clemens, Michael Crespin, and
Charles J. Finocchiaro find that the members who benefited the most from earmarking
were those that sat on the committees – not the most electorally vulnerable. He writes that senior
Committee members can benefit from up to 900 percent more in earmarks compared to ordinary
rank and file House members.
Congress has long guarded, and its members significantly value, the power of the purse. Control
of the legislative aspects of U.S. fiscal affairs not only equals policy influence, but also affords
election-minded members the opportunity to curry favor with constituents by directing projects
and funding to the states and districts they represent. Such earmarked projects (or
“congressionally directed spending”)—often characterized as “pork”—have seen a great deal of
popular attention in recent years, and porkbusters like Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Tom
Coburn (R-WY) have highlighted seemingly extravagant and nonsensical projects to great effect
(remember the Bridge to Nowhere?), leading Congress to reform the earmark process and, more
recently, impose an outright ban on the practice. As Figure 1 shows, both the number and total
dollar value of earmarks had been on the rise prior to the 2011 ban.
Figure 1 – Trends in Earmark Dollars and Projects, 1990-2010
The electoral motivations underlying pork barrel projects, and the potential for them to be used
by strategic party leaders to shore up their more vulnerable members, spurred a number of
studies arguing that allocation decisions were
based on such considerations. This
argument, while appealing in an era of
polarization, goes against a generation of
research that puts committees at the center of
congressional spending decisions. While the
majority party certainly has curtailed committee
independence, in new research Austin
Clemens, Michael Crespin, and I argue that
recent scholarship on earmarks has
understated the committee-centered nature of
who wins and who loses in the earmark game.
We began our study by interviewing staffers on
Capitol Hill, who told us that the locus of power
was still the 12 subcommittees of the House
Appropriations Committee, each of which was
responsible for compiling its own spending bill.
A part of that process involved members
submitting earmark requests to each
subcommittee. Notwithstanding both scholarly
treatments and popular understanding, the
majority party seems to have done little to manipulate the process to its advantage in the Congress we studied
beyond one thing—maintaining what seems to be a long-term understanding that earmarks are split roughly
60/40 between the majority and minority. Interestingly, that is a ratio that shows up in a number of other important
aspects of legislative organization like control of key committees.
Our data bears out this pattern. As Figure 2 shows, across the ten House Appropriations subcommittees that saw
significant earmark activity in the 110th Congress (2007-2008), most tracked closely to the proportionate split that
staffers discussed with us. House Democrats (then in the majority) accrued, on average, about 60 percent of the
earmark dollars while the minority Republicans saw about 40 percent of the funds come to them. The Defense
Appropriations subcommittee distributed more than three times as much earmark funding as any other panel
(more than $6 billion, about 40 percent of the total), and it fell very close to the 60/40 split overall. The partisan
seat division was about 54 to 46 percent in this Congress.
Figure 2 – Partisan Division of Earmark Dollars: Percent by Party and Subcommittee
We also found that, contrary to some recent
findings and popular perceptions, the
members who gained the most from the
earmark pie were not the most electorally-
vulnerable members or even those who
represented districts with the greatest
demand for the types of spending embodied
in particular bills. Rather, it was those same
members who were responsible for doling
out the pork in the first place—those who
had an official seat at the appropriations
table. The chair and ranking minority
member of the full committee, as well as
those serving in similar capacities on one of
the subcommittees, benefitted the most.
Rank-and-file appropriators did quite well
also. Figure 3 presents the additional pork,
beyond what an ordinary member of the
House might expect, for members in each of
these positions. The scale reflects
percentage change associated with various
characteristics of the legislators. The dots
represent the estimate from a regression
model that controls for a number of other factors as well, while the bands indicate the 95 percent confidence
interval around those estimates. For instance, serving on the Appropriations Committee corresponded with about
a 150 percent increase in earmark funds. Cardinals (subcommittee chairs) did slightly better. Notably David Obey
of Wisconsin served both as full committee chair and a cardinal, enjoying a multiplier effect of sorts. California
Republican Jerry Lewis, the ranking member of the full committee, was the most proficient—taking home nearly
900 percent more earmark funds than a rank and file House colleague.
Figure 3 – Changes in Earmarks Associated with Legislator Characteristics
In our research, we also argue that
spending is best understood at the
subcommittee level because that is where
the key decisions are made. While the
results above reflect total spending, the
dominance of the committee, and the
significantly less substantial effect of other
factors, is even more evident. As it happens,
even in an era of stark partisanship, it
seems that subcommittees are still
important players in the politics of spending
on Capitol Hill.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Earmarks
and Subcommittee Government in the U.S.
Congress’, in American Politics Research.
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